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In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls l defends two 
principles of justice by means of an appeal to a 
hypothetical "original position." However, these 
principles are strictly principles of justice by and for 
human beings, or at least by and for persons. Several 
philosophers have recently argued that tllis argument is 
flawed-is "speciesist"-in tllat there is no adequate 
justification for excluding animals from consideration 
as beings to whom fue principles of justice ought to 
apply.2 If tllose in tlle original position had to consider 
tlle possibility tllat tlley might be reborn as a calf ratller 
than a human, they might well choose different 
principles. If tlley did not consider that possibility, the 
original position, and the "veil of ignorance" which 
helps define it, would fail to protect against prejudice 
or guarantee fairness and impartiality. 
One must be careful to distinguish at fue outset 
different bases for objecting to the exclusion of 
nonhuman animals from Rawls's tlleory. One might 
argue tllat Rawls simply cannot exclude animals from 
his tlleory, that doing so is internally inconsistent. 
Alternatively, one might argue that while animals can 
consistently be excluded, tllere are good reasons for 
including them. This line of argument might eitller 
attempt to find tllese good reasons wifuin Rawls's own 
tlleoretical proclivities (fue second possible strategy) 
or-a third type ofproject-introduce new fuemes which 
are independent of, even contrary to, some of Rawls's 
basic commiunents. On tllis last strategy, one would be 
arguing tllat fue notion of an original position can be 
used in contexts ofuer tllan the Rawlsian one to generate 
a concept of justice tllat wouJld be, in VanDeVeer's 
terms, "interspecific."3 Of course, all of fuese attacks 
presuppose fue more basic claim fuat it is logically 
possible to include animals in the original position. 
In tllis paper, I shall only briefly comment on fue 
argument that inclusion does not lead to logical 
absurdity; Rawls's critics, most 1l10tably VanDeVeer, are 
correct in noting tllat tlle original position already has 
in place tlle mechanisms by which fue interests of 
animals could be considered in tlle same way as tllose 
of humans. I shall argue tllat any attempt to force an 
expansion of fue original position fails, and tllat Rawls 
is quite justified in restricting Ithe argument so fuat it 
does not apply to most animals. While the critics 
apparently take themselves to be engaged in arguments 
of fue first or second sort, tlley must, at best, content 
tllemselves witll sometlling like tlle tllird strategy. In 
order to see why, we must first examine tlle concept of 
tlle original position and tllen step back for a sense of 
fue broader context in which talk of fue original position 
is embedded. The description of Rawls will necessarily 
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be oversimplified, but tlle relevant portions of the 
argument can be identified. 
Rawls argues for his two principles of justice by 
appealing to "the original position," a hypothetical 
situation in which "free and equal" individuals choose 
the principles ofjustice tllat seem to tllem most rational 
and advantageous-principles to which they would 
voluntarily accede (TOJ, pp.12-13). To insure 
impartiality, we must imagine that tllese deliberations 
take place behind a "veil of ignorance"; the participants 
have no knowledge of social or economic status, gender, 
particular talents or abilities, or "particular inclinations 
and aspirations" (TOJ, p. 18). Rawls claims that 
individuals in this position would choose tlle following 
two principles: 
First: each person is to have an equal right to 
the most extensive basic liberty compatible 
with a similar liberty for others. Second: 
social and economic inequalities are to be 
arranged so that they are both (a) reasonably 
expected to be to everyone's advantage and 
(b) attached to positions and offices open to 
all. (TOJ, p. 60) 
Both principles tell us only about the proper 
treatment of persons. If 'person' does not include most 
nonhuman animals, adoption of tllese principles alone 
would still allow for the most egregious mistreatment 
of animals, and this gives rise to tlle criticism under 
consideration.4 The challenge is most forcefully posed 
by Donald VanDeVeer, who argues that we can 
redescribe tlle original position without lapsing into tlle 
conceptual incoherence of trying to imagine that we 
have a person, a dog and a pig deciding which principles 
to choose. Moreover, he argues tllat we must redescribe 
it in order to guarantee faimess, or else it will fail to 
function as Rawls intended it to. 
People in the original position are envisaged as a 
fairly sophisticated bunch. They are rational, can 
recognize a valid argument when one occurs to them, 
and can grasp complicated economic calculations such 
as maximin. However, if they knew tllat they would be 
that clever in "real life," they would tend to choose 
principles that would give favored treatment to clever 
people. Thus, tlle veil of ignorance is constructed to 
preclude that sort of inequality: tllOse in tlle original 
position must find principles tllat tlley could accept even 
if they tum out to be ill eqnipped to do moral philosophy. 
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This is the point at which VanDeVeer raises his 
challenge. If people in tlle original position are not 
allowed to act on the knowledge that they will be 
"sophisticated reasoners," it seems equally legitimate 
to insist that they should not be allowed tlle knowledge 
that tlley are moral persons at all.5 Doing so would 
encourage those in the original position to adopt 
principles that would protect nonhuman animals, 
without the absurd requirement that they must formulate 
these principles using only the limited capacities of such 
animals. It is as if Rawls recognizes that sophisticated 
intellectual ability should not be a morally relevant 
characteristic in determining just treatment, and so sets 
up tlle original position to make sure tllat it will not be 
favored by the chosen principles. Buthe simply assumes 
without argument tllat being a rational (though not 
necessarily moral) agent or moral person is morally 
relevant, and hence allows that information to be 
accessible, even under the veil of ignorance. In 
VanDeVeer's words: 
Should not the veil of ignorance exclude tlle 
knowledge that members of tlle society [i.e., 
all individuals whose treatment is dictated by 
the principles chosen in the original position] 
will have a concept of their good or of 
justice? .. The rationale of a veil of ignorance, 
on Rawls's own view, is to guarantee impartial 
consideration of principles.6 
If VanDeVeer is correct, Rawls has no adequate 
justification for assuming that the original position 
should allow those choosing the principles to proceed 
on the assumption that they will be moral persons; 
indeed, such an assumption would lead to just the sort 
of self-interested prejudice that the veil of ignorance 
was meruIt to prevent. If they are not entitled to tllat 
assumption, VanDeVeer suggests tllat they would 
choose different principles: 
tlley might choose principles which preclude 
treatment of any sentient creature (not posing 
a serious threat to others) which would render 
no life at all for tllat creature, on balance, 
...preferable to its living. I call tllis the Life-
Preferability Principle.? 
In short, the problem to be addressed is whetller it 
is legitimate to justify one's choice of principles by 
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appeal to an original position in which tile participants 
are allowed to assume that tiley are/will be moral 
persons, as tilat concept is defined by Rawls. Going 
back to our second and tilird strategies, we can first ask 
whetiler tile Rawlsian framework provides any reason 
for doing so and, second, consider whetiler abandoning 
Rawls at tilis point yields a more satisfactory tileory. 
VanDeVeer does not distinguish tilese two tactics, but 
since I shall argue tilat tile first will not work, he can at 
best hope for tile second. 
To determine how a Rawlsian might respond to 
VanDeVeer's challenge, we must go back to an essential 
aspect of Rawls's starting point: his rejection of 
utilitarianism. I do not wish to re-examine his reasons 
for that rejection here but merely to note timt it is 
essential to his tileory: any attempt to extend or modify 
tile description of tile original position in a Rawlsian 
spirit must be consistent with that rejection of 
utilitarianism. More specifically, tile entire idea of an 
original position and tile veil of ignorance is presented 
as an alternative to utilitarianism; therefore, any 
criticism of Rawls's strategy must be consistent witil 
tile rejection of utilitarianism iliat motivates tile strategy, 
or else must reach furtiler and attack the anti-utilitarian 
arguments on which tile original position is based. 
We can frame tile same point in a more positive light. 
Describing tile original position is tile second step in 
an argument which begins by arguing tilat a tileory of 
justice must, above all, be structured so as to avoid what 
Rawls has already argued is the main flaw of 
utilitarianism: tile failure to respect individuality. Rawls 
seems to assume what otilers have argued for: to respect 
individuality one must reject the idea tilat it is rational 
(rationally obligatory?) to have no or less interest in 
tile fulfillment ofone's own desires as in the fulfillment 
of anotiler being's equally strong interest. 
If one rejects utilitarianism in favor of respect for 
individuality, one moves inevitably, as Rawls does, 
toward a system which protects the individual's ability 
to choose and carry out his/her own plans, to further 
her/his own purposes. In Rawls, this is carried one step 
furtiler: the sense of individuality which carries moral 
weight involves having and caring about a life-plan. 
Thus, he defines moral persons as having "a conception 
of tileir good (as expressed by a rational plan of life)" 
(TOJ, p. 505, my emphasis). Whether all of tilese 
conclusions follow from a rejection of utilitarianism 
remains to be seen, but that is how, in Rawls, the notion 
of moral personhood is developed and how it comes to 
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be built into tile description of tile original position. 
The choice and ordering of tile two principles ofjustice 
is then no surprise, since the original position is intended 
to reflect tilis prior commitment to tile moral signif-
icance of an ability to act as an individual, more 
specifically an ability to choose and act on a life-plan 
of one's own. This emphasis on individuality is, again, 
sometiling that classical utilitarianism is supposed to 
be unable to accommodate.8 
All of this suggests tilree possible criticisms of 
Rawls: 
1. He has not adequately justified his first step, 
the rejection of utilitarianism in favor of a 
tileory tilat puts primary weight on freedom and 
moral personhood. 
2. The description of tile original position does not 
follow from tile first step, and cannot be justified 
by appeal to it. 
3. There is an inconsistency in the overall argument, 
and tile burden of proof is on Rawls, not tile critic, 
to diagnose tile source of tile problem. 
The first criticism might lead us to abandon some basic 
elements of tile Rawlsian view and perhaps follow tile 
tilird strategy described at tile beginning of tilis paper. 
The second criticism leads naturally to tile second 
strategy, and the third criticism follows tile first strategy. 
Let us consider each of these in tum. 
The first-a frontal attack on Rawls's rejection of 
utilitarianism, and his consequent emphasis on respect 
for tile individual agent or subject-is certainly open 
to fierce debate, as demonstrated by numerous 
commentators on Rawls. Moreover, it is not limited to 
concerns about animals: tile controversy will not center 
on tile exclusion of animals but, ratiler, on general 
considerations for or against utilitarianism. 
Despite its apparent attractiveness, I propose not to 
evaluate this tactic. My primary justification fordoing 
so is that the criticisms leveled against Rawls's 
exclusion of animals have not objected specifically to 
this aspect of the argument. Two otiler reasons reinforce 
this inclination. First, any dispube over tilis starting point 
is not peculiar to concerns about animals: it can be, and 
has been, raised purely within tile context of duties, 
obligations, and justice toward anyone or anything who 
is not a moral person in the relevant sense-and tilis 
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would include some human beings. Therefore, such an 
objection would not support the specific charge of 
speciesism. Second, several debates within the "ethics 
and animals" literature serve to reinforce the Rawlsian 
line that utilitarianism (at least in its classical guise) 
pays insufficient attention to the status of the individual. 
Regan's emphasis on the moral status ofbeing a "subject 
of a life"9 and even Peter Singer's qualified position on 
replaceabilitylO move us in a direction congenial to 
Rawls's first premise. The sense of "individuality" (as 
opposed to merely being a receptacle of pleasurable 
experiences) which is morally relevant is sure to be hotly 
debated, but until one argues (as someone like Regan 
might want toll but has not explicitly done) that Rawls 
has set the standard for "subject" too high, this first 
method of attack on Rawls must be discounted. 
The second strategy would be to argue that Rawls's 
rejection of utilitarianism does not justify the most 
common interpretation of the description of the original 
position: that it does not warrant allowing those in the 
original position to assume that they will not be 
'incarnated' as nonhuman animals. I think this 
complaint is correct but achieves only a very minor 
victory for two reasons. Rawls himself emphasizes 
moral personhood, not biological facts about member-
ship in the species Homo sapiens, as a crucial factor. 12 
Thus, a few nonhuman animals, perhaps dolphins or 
gorillas, might be capable of fonnulating a rational life 
plan and valuing it because it is their own life plan; 
they would thereby qualify as the sort of beings that 
participants in the original position ought to include in 
their considerations. Nonetheless, the best scientific 
evidence we have to date would indicate that this is a 
plausible hypothesis only with a very small number of 
species: it will not, for example, save the veal calf or 
the laboratory rat. Elliot does not think this is an obstacle 
to including animals, because we can still "think 
ourselves into their position" and make reasonable 
inferences about what sort of life would be preferable 
to and for them. I 3 This, however, misses the point: the 
issue is not whether nonhuman animals prefer one sort 
of life to another but whether the very choosing of a 
life-plan of one's own is important to them. 
According to Rawls's argument, those in the original 
position, even though they do not know what their life-
plan will be, are supposed to know that they will have a 
rational life plan, i.e., to know that following plan A 
rather than plan B matters simply because one has 
chosen A rather than B. 14 This, as noted earlier, is 
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presented as a consequence of the rejection of 
utilitarianism. Once one grants that much, it follows 
that those in the original position are justified in 
assuming that they will not be reincarnated as anything 
other than a human being or perhaps a member of one 
of a very select and limited group of species. As hinted 
at above, there may be a sense of "individuality" which 
at the same time preserves the force of the objection to 
utilitarianism while at the same time demanding less 
than Rawls demands ofmoral persons, but such amiddle 
ground has not been successfully delineated. IS 
The third strategy in attacking Rawls is simply to 
point out an inconsistency and leave it to the Rawlsian 
to decide how to fix it. Those who have pursued this 
course have identified such an inconsistency, the 
discussion of so-called "marginal cases".16 Although 
the inconsistency is real, the modification of Rawls's 
position on this point that seems most consistent with 
his overall theory is not one that results in animals being 
considered in the original position. 
The tenn "marginal cases" refers to human beings 
who are so severely retarded or brain damaged that they 
lack the most rudimentary ability to make conscious, 
deliberate, rational choices. We can restrict the field 
even further by specifying that they are individuals who 
never had such abilities, and have no realistic chance 
ofever acquiring them, since individuals in the original 
position may want to take into account the fact that they 
will start life as helpless infants and may be the subject 
of an accident or disease that could destroy their ability 
to function as a moral person (TOI, pp. 248-250). Such 
"marginal cases" are clearly less able to construct or 
follow a life plan than a pig or a hamster,17 yet Rawls 
still accords them protection that he does not extend to 
nonhuman animals. It should be noted immediately that 
Rawls's discussion of this topic is both tentative and 
equivocal (TOI pp. 248-250, 506-510). If we accept 
his critics' assumption that those in the original position 
would extend the principles of justice to aU human 
beings, even marginal cases, then Rawls is guilty of 
inconsistency. But the inconsistency is easily remedied, 
if indeed it is supported by the text at all. 
Given Rawls's commitment to liberty, moral 
personhood, and the importance of freedom to choose, 
the only solution consistent with a Rawlsian framework 
would be to accept that marginal cases are not included 
in considerations of justice. This, however, should not 
horrify us, because it does not leave marginal cases 
without any moral protection. Rawls takes pains to 
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admit that the theory of justice is not meant as a 
complete moral theory (1DJ, p. 512) and we might well 
have many good reasons for extending special 
protection to marginal cases. IS The possibility for 
inconsistency exists, in that the full but as yet 
unarticulated moral theory could turn out to accord 
protection to marginal cases lhat it denies to animals 
without sufficient reason, but that hypothetical 
possibility does not pose a serious threat to the theory 
of justice as presented by Rawls. 
To sum up: we can describe a theory of justice that 
is consistent in both letter and spirit with Rawls's that 
has the following characteristics: 
1. Rawls is justified in specifying that all those in 
the original position may assume that they will 
be moral persons in the society to be governed by 
the principles which they choose. Thus, the 
principles of justice which they choose might 
easily tum out not to cover many who are not 
moral persons. 
2. Nonetheless, some individuals who are not 
included as moral persons, or (not necessarily 
equivalently) those to whom the principles of 
justice apply, may be moral subjects: our complete 
moral theory of duties and obligations may show 
that we have directmoral duties toward some who 
are not moral persons, e.g. marginal cases and 
nonhuman animals. 
3. It is not a foregone conclusion that marginal cases 
and nonhuman animals cannot be accorded 
differential treatment without lapsing into 
speciesism, but any attempt to justify differential 
treaunent must still be produced. 
The implications of this issue extend beyond an 
abstract interest in the intemal consistency ofA Theory 
ofJustice; they provide important clues about what an 
adequate account of our duties toward animals might 
look like. There are at least two lessons to leam. First, 
the notion that being a moral person or subject is morally 
relevant has not yet been impeached; it deserves further 
consideration and elaboration as an important difference 
between most humans and most nonhuman animals. 
Second, any attempt to build a theory on such a 
foundation must take care to avoid inconsistency in its 
treaUnent of marginal cases. Although lhese two points 
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are only a start, they do point in what I believe is the 
right direction. 
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Commenta,ry: 
On the Utility of Contracts 
Steve F. Sapontzis 
California State University, Hayward 
In many discussions that touch on animal rights, the 
participants clearly feel they know the truth and proceed 
to shape arguments to fit that truth. We owe Professor 
Russow our thanks for a careful, thoughtful discussion 
which has no axe to grind. 
If I understand her argument, it runs something 
like this. 
A. To understand whether participants in the original 
position could be incarnated as nonhuman animals, 
we need to understand what the original position 
is supposed to accomplish. 
B. The original position was set up in response to 
Rawls's dissatisfactions with utilitarianism, 
principally to overcome (what he believes to be) 
utilitarianism's failure to respect individuality. 
C. Individuality, in the morally significant sense, 
involves having and caring about a life-plan. 
D. Consequently, the participants in the original 
position can be assured of being incarnated only 
as beings capable of having and caring about life-
plans, so-called "moral persons," because only such 
beings are the object of the original position exercise. 
E. Very few, if any, nonhuman animals are capable of 
having and caring about life-plans. 
F. Consequently, the participants in the original 
position can be assured that with, at most, very few 
exceptions, they will be incarnated as human beings. 
DISCUSSION 
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